siehe Beitrag vom 28. Juni 2005 hier, über den geheimen und mysteriösen 9-tägigen Besuch des CIA Direktors im Albanien und auf dem Balkan.
Bei seinem Besuch auf dem Balkan in Sarajewo und Tirana, machte Porter Goss der CIA Direktor seine Verärgerung sehr deutlich, weil die UCK jetzt KPC im Kosovo und die Albanische Regierung rein kriminelle Organisationen sind und die Albanische Regierung direkt mit den Islamischen Terror Gruppen verbunden ist.
Und was noch peinlicher ist, das die UN diese Mafia Verbindungen und direkte Verbindung zum Islamischen Terrorismus, ignoriert.
Die UN will von diesen Dingen, welche direkt vor ihrem Augen abläuft und welche sie sponsert und deren Leute sie bezahlt, absolut Nichts wissen: Die UN bezahlt und organisiert das Organisierte Verbrechen im Kosovo und Deutsche Politiker verdienen sich dabei eine goldene Nase.
Europe’s New Terror Profile and the State of Play in the Balkans
by Christopher Deliso
The latest revelations from European terror “experts” hardly come as news for us in the Balkans – that is, the confluence between terrorism and organized crime, and the increasingly fluid, almost transient nature of their organizational structures.
First of all, relays the IHT:
“‘We are seeing a terrorist threat that keeps changing,’ Pierre de Bousquet, the head of France’s domestic intelligence service, said in an interview in Paris. ‘Often the groups are not homogenous, but a variety of blends.
“‘Hard-core Islamists are mixing with petty criminals. People of different backgrounds and nationalities are working together. Some are European-born or have dual nationalities that make it easier for them to travel. The networks are much less structured than we used to believe. Maybe it’s the mosque that brings them together, maybe it’s prison, maybe it’s the neighborhood. And that makes it much more difficult to identify them and uproot them.’”
As usual, what is news to Western Europe has long been known here. Yet a jittery “international community” has largely ignored it, being eager not to rock the boat of alleged ethnic “confidence-building” by pointing fingers. However, this public front does not mean that EU intelligence services have been ignoring the issue, as we will see later.
Considering the vast amount of material already existing on the Internet regarding Balkan terrorism, I will only discuss a few unique examples, and provide links to or brief summaries of things I consider to be common (enough) knowledge.
Nevertheless, for other exclusive info I’ve written on these topics – texts that can only be found in one place – you’ll want to see the special message in the last section of this article.
The CIA Bears Down on the Balkans
IPS News reported on 25 July that in the wake of the London bombings, the powers that be are looking at the Balkans with renewed interest – and specifically, at the intersection of terrorism and crime here.
According to IPS, new CIA chief Porter Goss visited Sarajevo and Tirana last month, in the words of British military and defense analyst Paul Beaver, “to express grave concerns of Washington because of [these governments’] cooperation with radical Islamic groups.” According to Beaver, “a part of the investigation dealing with the London blasts is aimed at links between radical Islamists in Bosnia and Kosovo with international terrorist groups” in cahoots with powerful Albanian mafia clans. A Bosnian Serb news source added that Goss handed the government a list of 900 names of potential al-Qaeda-linked individuals.
Terror and Criminality
The contention that the former Albanian paramilitary group that fought Milosevic in Kosovo, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, UCK in Albanian) was connected with Islamic terrorist organizations has been fiercely contested. The pro-Albanian lobby denies it vehemently, whereas the pro-Serb faction upholds the thesis. The facts, however, lend at least partial support to the latter, for the period up to and during NATO’s 1999 intervention. The argument that the KLA has always been funded by organized crime is also beyond doubt.
Whether the post-1999 KLA continued to foster ties with foreign fundamentalists is a more difficult question. After all, with the war concluded victoriously, what use would the secular enough KLA have for such people?
After NATO, the KLA was officially “decommissioned.” A large number of these former “freedom fighters” were assimilated into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), the heavy-handed police force that has served side-by-side with the UNMIK police. But behind it all were the powerful warlords from various clans, the most famous being Hasim Thaci and Ramush Haradinaj, the erstwhile Kosovo “prime minister” currently facing trial in the Hague. Even perceived peaceniks such as President Ibrahim Rugova were said to have their own “private armies,” or at least a very substantial security detail.
Still, as in every post-revolutionary situation, not everyone could be satisfied. Kosovo quickly descended into gangland murders as the numerous factions and interests staked out their turf. The events of 9/11, and the resulting crackdown on Islamic fundamentalists across the Balkans, only exacerbated this splintering process, which has heated up over the past few months.
A Whistleblower Emerges
Former OSCE Security Officer Thomas Gambill: “the UN didn’t want to know” about Islamic terrorism in Kosovo.
By early 2002, the Albanian militant/criminal movement had divided into at least three different groups, says Thomas Gambill, a former OSCE security chief with responsibility for the eastern part of Kosovo. “You had the hardcore nationalists; the common criminals, and the Islamic fanatics,” says the burly, silver-haired former Marine, describing the groups he was tasked with monitoring.
A red-blooded American and spirited supporter of the “war on terror,” Gambill worked in Kosovo from October 1999 until a tense departure in spring 2004, not long after the March riots. Throughout his tenure, he believed that UNMIK was trying to avoid the escalating threat of terrorist attacks, the increasing chokehold of the Mafia, and their connections with Islamic fundamentalists. But when he started to blow the whistle, Gambill was ignored, then reprimanded. “They just didn’t want to hear it,” he says. “For them, I was a headache.”
When I met with Tom Gambill last spring in Pristina, just prior to his departure from the mission, he spoke with frustration of a series of e-mails he had sent back to a State Department staffer, which apparently had been received with little interest. Recently, Gambill repeated to me his claims that OSCE superiors had “warned” him repeatedly regarding his habit of “sending out ‘unsolicited’ reports to official sources concerning the Albanian extremists’ strategy, activity of the Islamic extremists, and other bits of information that I had confirmed concerning criminal activity.” While it’s difficult to prove, Gambill believes his whistleblowing had something to do with his OSCE contract not being extended.
Aside from fighting over the loot, the KLA split was also caused by candid assessments of what path would most satisfy common interests. But by early 2003, when the so-called Albanian National Army (ANA, or AKSH in Albanian) started up a high-profile series of bombings, the camps were defined.
The nationalists were split between diehard ANA supporters and those less keen on the “Greater Albania” project. Both sides were fearful of upsetting their relationship with the United States, and they sought to distance themselves from the Islamists, whom they correctly regarded as being unhelpful in respect to winning their ultimate goal of an independent Kosovo. The Islamists, however, were motivated by religion and supported by foreign governments and their NGOs – chiefly those of Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Iran. Many of these charities were shut down in the aftermath of 9/11, though others hung on. The goal of these governments throughout has been to proliferate their own brands of Islam in Kosovo, under the guise of humanitarian relief and with the tangible result of mosque-building.
Both groups had a lot in common with the third, the armed common criminals; in fact, this bunch was spawned by and predated both (along with those recruits drawn by money and not ideologies). Now, the overlap is almost total. The powerful Albanian Mafia has long had a large share of the European heroin market and also trades in women, weapons, and stolen antiquities, among other goods. By necessity, maintaining such an operation in the global age involves “cooperation” with diverse and far-flung groups. Foreign Islamists make up merely one.
Contrary to what spirited defenders of the Serbs argue, it does not seem that Islamic ideology has played the key role in drawing most Albanians to fight. So why would the Albanians – nationalists, criminals, or otherwise – need the Islamists?
For the answer to this question, we must keep in mind three things: global trafficking routes; sustaining the rule of lawlessness; and unique services provided by foreign Islamic factions.